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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects on consumers’ welfare of the privatisation policy 
carried out in the UK since 1979. The approach we follow sees the privatisation 
of a State owned enterprise within the broader framework of the “policy 
reform” theory (Drèze and Stern, 1990). By adopting this perspective, the 
change in consumers’ welfare “with” and “without” privatisations can be 
studied by appropriate welfare measures. We claim that an advantage of our 
approach is that of being able to provide the required welfare assessment in a 
simplified way by means of a limited set of information. In particular, we show 
that a series of welfare measures only based on aggregate information can be 
used once one becomes ready to accept the use of first and second order 
approximations and a few “reasonable” assumptions on the shape of demand 
functions. These welfare measures are  subsequently used for the evaluation of 
the welfare effects related to price variations in seven British privatised public 
utilities. We conclude that the contribution to consumers’ welfare of the 
privatisation policy in the UK, when compared to the huge transfers involved in 
the process, has been rather modest. 
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1. Introduction 
The privatisation policy carried out in the UK by Conservative 
governments during 18 years (since 1979 until 1997) has 
represented the largest and most famous episode of a new attitude 
towards the economic role of the state in the economy. Moreover, 
British privatisations have also anticipated by several years similar 
policies in other countries, so that they constitute a benchmark for 
other countries where the process still is in its infancy.  
 
This justifies an analysis based on strictly economic grounds. 
Given the high number and the variety of the agents involved 
(consumers, shareholders, workers, taxpayers), the evaluation of 
the overall welfare impact of a large scale divestiture represents a 
very extensive task. This paper is part of a wider project (see 
Florio, 2002) aimed at attaining this goal. Our more limited 
objective pursued here is that of assessing the welfare effects of 
British privatisations on consumers. 
 
For this purpose, the approach we follow here is a one which sees 
the privatisation of a state-owned enterprise within the broader 
framework of the “policy reform” theory (Drèze and Stern, 1990). 
Mainly known in its “tax reform” version, this approach allows for 
a normative analysis of policy regimes changes in a second best 
framework in the presence of small deviations from the status quo 
(Dixit, 1975). Whether or not the cases under examination can be 
considered a “small reform” with reference to the ex ante and ex 
post market values can be assessed from the price and expenditure 
values reported on the top of table 1. In any case, a policy reform 
approach maintains its validity also in the case of large reforms 
because it only entails the knowledge of the characteristics of the 
economic system in the neighbourhood of the starting point 
(which should be known by definition). 
 
By adopting this viewpoint, the change in consumers’ welfare 
“with” and “without” privatisations can be studied by means of 
the tools of applied welfare economics. The crucial variables are 
the prices, quantities and some characteristics of the demand 
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functions (once opportune definitions or assumptions about them 
have been done). 
 
Indeed, when looking through the seminal contributions by 
Guesnerie (1977) and Ahmad and Stern (1984), the tax-policy 
reform theory turns out to be a “price reform” theory, that is an 
approach where the value judgement are contingent to the 
“direction” (and the “length” in the case of non marginal reforms) 
of the price vectors considered in the analysis. As a consequence, 
also the evaluation of privatisation effects on consumers welfare 
must be first of all based on the scrutiny of the market price 
behaviour.1 
 
However, the identification of the price variations constitutes a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for a reliable welfare 
analysis. First, industry market prices have to be compared with 
the consumer price index, in order to check for increases or 
decreases in “real terms”. Second, prices variations have to be 
compared with productivity changes determined by technological 
shocks or changes in demand conditions (so that in these cases it 
would be wrong to attribute to privatisation effects which would 
have happened even in public firms). Third, when privatisation is 
accompanied by a change in market structure, for example from a 
statutory monopoly to a system of oligopolistic competition, 
changes in prices could be wholly or partially attributable to 
increased competitive pressure and not to the change in 
ownership; similar considerations can be made for the particular 
system of public control of prices or quantities supplied, which for 
example may change from being a quite lax or discretionary cost-
plus regime to being a stricter one (e.g. of a price cap “RPI-X” 
with a high “X” element). Fourth, by themselves, price and 
quantity variations do not capture welfare effects due to 
endogenous changes in the quality of the products (Newbery, 
2000, discusses several examples). 
 
                                                 
1 This approach is also implicitly taken in some empirical analyses (e.g., 
Waddams-Price and Hancock, 1998). 
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Having said this, all in all, the credibility of traditional welfare 
analyses is conditional on the close scrutiny of the determinants of 
price variations. However, once these problems are solved, we 
claim that the advantage of a price reform approach consists of 
being able to provide the required welfare assessment with a 
limited set of information on the characteristics of demand 
functions.  
 
In fact, an unsatisfactory element regarding standard welfare 
analyses is that they often appear more an academic exercise, 
carried out with complex econometric methods and heavy 
investments, rather than an effective tool in the hands of the 
regulators or governments for promptly assessing the effects of 
privatisation programs which have been already carried out or 
simply designed. Indeed, this is in contrast with the “reform theory 
philosophy” and de facto limits the real relevance of applied welfare 
economics. It is an aim of this paper to foster the possibility of an 
easy implementation of this kind of analysis by showing that a 
series of “easy-to-implement” welfare measures are available once 
one becomes ready to accept a few “reasonable” assumptions. 
With the term “easy-to-implement” we mean a method which only 
requires the collection of information (at an aggregate level) easily 
accessible from the most common statistical sources, or at worse 
requires limited elaboration starting from them. 
2. Welfare effects of price changes: some approximated 
indicators 
For the aim of this paper, we restrict the following analysis to the 
welfare effects referable to the price changes which can be 
associated to the transfer of some production from the public to 
the private sector. As a consequence, henceforth the term “price 
change” will be referred to a hypothetical “net privatisation effect” 
(someway computed). 
 
By defining these (consumption) price changes with the symbol 
dq , the welfare variation dW  can be recovered starting from a 
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generic Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function, which 
arguments are the following individual (indirect) utility functions 
( )( )hhhh yvv zpq ,,≡ ,   (1) 
where the vectors q and p respectively refer to consumption and 
production prices, yh is the exogenous personal disposable income 
and zh is a vector of social-demographic characteristics. 
 
 
Marginal price variations 
 
A variation of consumption prices implies a welfare variation equal 
to: 
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By introducing the concept of marginal social value of household h 
income and defining it as h
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In the tax reform literature it is a customary simplification to 
consider irrelevant the cross demand effects. In this case the 
welfare variation reduces to 
i
h
h
i
h
i
i
dqxdq
q
WdW ∑−=∂∂= β .  (4) 
 
Equation (4) represents a first useful formula for the case of 
privatisations with marginal effects on prices. From an empirical 
viewpoint, it is important to observe that, as long as marginal 
variations are considered, the assessment of the welfare effects of a 
 6 
price change does not need any behavioural parameter such as 
price or income elasticities. Remark that, in case no different 
welfare weights are given to households, equation (4) reduces to a 
Laspeyres price index 
 
Previous two equations also clarify that, by adopting a Bergson-
Samuelson Social Welfare Function, the value of welfare changes 
reduces to a double weighting of the price variation, where the 
weights consist of observable market data (the individual demand) 
and a value judgement (the welfare weight hβ ). 
 
A different way of expressing formulae (3) and (4) which is not 
constrained to the use of household level data, namely those 
referring to the individual demand of goods, relates the welfare 
variation to the so-called distributional characteristic (henceforth 
DC). By defining the latter as  
∑≡
h
h
i
h
i
i xX
d β1 ,   (5) 
 
and substituting it into (4) we get: 
iii dqXddW −≡ .   (6) 
 
In principle, the value of previous expression can be immediately 
calculated with aggregate data only, provided that the information 
on the DC of good i is available. If this is not the case, a limited 
elaboration based on households expenditure surveys data is 
required. 
 
As it is well known (e.g. Stern, 1987), the DC can be expressed in 
covariance form between consumption shares and welfare weights, 
so that equation (6) can also be written as: 
i
h
i
h
i
i dqx
xXdW 






+−= ββ ,cov ,  (7) 
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where ∑=
h
h
H
ββ  is the average of welfare weights over the 
households, which value depends on the scale adopted for the 
hβ s. 
 
Sometimes, a DC normalised for β  (e.g. Newbery, 1995) is used, 
that is:  
∑≡
h
h
i
h
i
i xX
d β
β1~ .   (5a) 
 
In this case the equivalent of expressions (6) and (7) are: 
iii dqXddW
~β−= ,   (6a) 
and  
i
h
i
h
i
i dqx
xXdW 






+−= β
β,cov1 .  (7a) 
 
The interpretation of (7) and (7a) is quite straightforward: the 
larger the share of a good consumed by the poorest households 
(those with a high hβ  associated to them) the larger is the welfare 
loss. 
 
When specific DC are to be calculated, the specification of the 
social weights hβ  is required. As it is well-known, the most used 
parameterisation is derived from the following additive social 
welfare function of iso-elastic utility functions, originally proposed 
by Atkinson (1970): ( )
∑
∑
=
=
−
==
≠−=
H
h
h
H
h
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e
e
EkW
1
1
1
1for        ,ln     
1for     ,
1 ,  (8) 
where hE  is the personal expenditure by individual or household 
h. The parameter k is usually chosen in order to take into account 
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the number of equivalent adults within each household or in order 
to assign a weight equal to 1 to the individual with the lowest 
expenditure or the average expenditure (which yields respectively 
weights of the form ( ) ehh EE −= 1β  and ( ) ehh EE −=β ). The 
choice of e determines the degree of “inequality aversion”. It is 
customary to undertake some sensitivity analysis by considering 
values ranging from 0 (the Benthamian case) to 5 (very high 
inequality aversion). 
 
A reference value is often represented by e=1, which involves the 
value judgment that a marginal transfer to someone at half the 
expenditure level of another has a social value of twice that of the 
reference person. By setting k=1/H, in this case we obtain 
hh E1=β  and ( )hEΗΜ=1β , where ( )hEΗΜ  is the harmonic 
mean of individual consumption. Hence, the expression (7a) 
reduces to: 
( ) i
i
ih
ii dqE
wEXdW 


ΗΜ−=  ,  (9) 
where iw  is the average budget share on good i. 
By setting 1=β , that is ( ) hhh EEHM=β , previous equation 
can be additionally simplified to  
i
i
i
i dqE
wXdW 


−= .   (9b) 
 
As a general comment, it must be pointed out that these “socially 
weighted measures” do not account for one of the most elusive 
effects to capture in the transition from public to private firm, that 
is the change in the regime of price discrimination.2  
                                                 
2 In the case of multi-product firms, sometimes both public and private firms 
are capable of charging different prices to different consumers for the same 
product. In turn, the different types of consumers could have different 
functions of demand, so that variation in welfare due to the change in regime 
would need to be ascertained for the different types of consumers. 
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Large price variations 
 
For the case of large price variations, we make an option for the 
use of second order approximations,3 which can refer both to 
money metric measures (Harberger, 1964) and more general 
welfare measures allowing for distributional considerations (Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel, 1996). 
 
Unlike the case of the evaluation of small reforms, the assessment 
of large price variations usually requires information about 
individual demand elasticities. For example, the second order 
welfare approximation proposed by Banks et al. (1996) takes the 
form (with redundant notation of the elasticities required for its 
implementation): 






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i
h
i
q
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q
q
x
q
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q
W
β
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2
11 , (10) 
that is: 
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h
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x
q
xq
q
W βββ
2
1 , (10b) 
 
whilst the equivalent money metric approximation by Harberger 
(1964) is: 







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∂
∂∆+−≈∆
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i
i
i
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i
i
i
h
hc
i
i
i
x
q
q
x
q
qx
q
X
2
11 , (11) 
where the “c” stands for “compensated”. 
 
                                                 
3 The typical advantage of welfare approximate measures consists of their 
reduced informational requirements, as compared to the computation of “exact” 
measures based on the estimation of household expenditure functions. In 
Starrett words: “ …the method gives up on collecting hypothetical information 
concerning demand conditions in unobserved parts of the economic 
environment and instead extrapolates to those areas using curvatures at the 
status quo'' (Starrett ,1988, p. 246). In addition, exact welfare measures suffer 
major problems in aggregation (Auerbach, 1985). 
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Reliable estimation of individual elasticities requires the availability 
of microdata of adequate quality and the imposition of some 
identifying assumptions.4 For the case in which these two 
conditions cannot be ensured by the analyst, a few additional 
restrictions or approximations are to be adopted in order to allow 
for an evaluation based on aggregated data (or, at least, elasticities) 
only. 
 
The simplest solution for avoiding the use of household level 
information is to give up assigning different welfare weights in the 
equation (10) above. As a matter of fact, if we impose 
hh   allfor   1=β , we get: 



∂
∂∆+−≈∆
∆ ∑∑
h i
h
ii
h
h
i
i q
xqx
q
W
2
, 
from which:  


 ∆+−≈∆
∆
ii qX
i
i
i
i q
qX
q
W
,2
1 η .  (12) 
 
Hence, a second order approximation which keeps apart 
distributional concerns only requires information about the 
aggregate demand and demand elasticity. 
 
The results are slightly more complex in the general case 1≠hβ , 
for some h. Let us first rewrite equation (10) as 
 


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

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∆ ∑∑
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W
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2 ,
, (13) 
                                                 
4 With H individuals, the estimation of H parameters would of course be 
impossible. In order to overcome this problem, somewhat ad hoc (identifying) 
hypotheses must be done about the constancy among the individuals of some 
values. For example, in the well known case of the AIDS model by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), the expenditure elasticities are recovered through the 
assumption that: ( ) ih
h
i
Px
w β=∂
∂
ln
 for h=1, …, H. 
 11 
that is 





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

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∂
∂
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h
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q
W
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2 ,
, 
where an additional approximation has been done by assuming the 
price invariance of welfare weights.5 By using the definition of 
distributional characteristic in (5) and exploiting again the 
definition of covariance we have: 
b
q
x
q
x
H h i
i
i
h
ih +=



∂
∂
∂
∂∑ ββ1 ,  (14) 
where id  is the distributive characteristics, ii qX ,η  is the aggregate 
price elasticity, and 







∂
∂
∂
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h
i
q
x
q
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Hence, by substituting (14) into (13) we finally get: 
( ) 

 ∆++−=∆
∆
ii qX
i
i
ii
i q
qbdX
q
W
,2
ηβ .  (15) 
 
In the case the use of id
~  is preferred, it easy to verify that the 
equivalent to equation (15) is: 
( )  ∆++−=∆∆ ii qXiiiii qqbdXqW ,2~1~ ηβ   (15a) 
where 







∂
∂
∂
∂= β
β h
i
i
i
h
i
q
x
q
xb ,cov~ .6 
 
                                                 
5 This actually is an usual assumption in the applied welfare analyses, although 
theoretically weak (e.g., Roberts, 1980; Banks et al., 1996). For an empirical study 
in which welfare weights price elasticity is taken into account see Ray (1999). 
 
6 Equation (15) and (15a) become equal when scaling welfare weights so that 
1=β . 
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Hence, the estimation of a second order welfare approximation 
based on aggregated data, again, requires some information about 
the DC associated to the good which provision is being privatised. 
In addition, an estimate of the aggregate demand elasticity to price 
is required. The importance of this behavioural parameter is 
enhanced or tempered by the presence of a second distributive 
parameter (b), which takes smaller values when the demand by the 
poorest is more rigid.7 
 
Unfortunately, differently from the other parameters, the 
covariances b and b~  can be computed only after having estimated 
the individual demand derivatives, which requires the use of 
microeconometric estimation techniques. As an alternative, one 
can make use of functional form assumptions. For example, in the 
case of linear Engel curves, expression (15) clearly simplifies to  


 ∆+−=∆
∆
ii qX
i
i
ii
i q
qdX
q
W
,2
ηβ   (16) 
given that we have b=0. The parameter b is also equal to 0 when 
the individual demand functions are linear, an hypothesis which 
can be seen as a good approximation of the real shape of the 
demand function in a neighbourhood of the starting point.8 
 
 
Second order approximations in the case of Engel curves linear or quadratic in 
the logarithm of total expenditure. 
 
Besides this limited case, it is of interest to infer at least what the 
sign of b could be. For this purpose, we can base our subsequent 
analysis on a much more accepted (in empirical microeconomics) 
Engel curve structure such as the Working-Leser one, which is 
                                                 
7 With additive utility functions this is always the case for “necessities”, due to 
the proportionality between price and expenditure elasticity implied by this 
functional assumption (cf. Deaton, 1974; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a, ch. 5). 
 
8 Hence, this hypothesis is typically reliable only in case of small price reforms. 
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implied by the well known “TRANSLOG” and “AIDS” demand 
systems, and its quadratic generalisations, such as the “QUAIDS” 
demand model by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). 
 
In these models, the individual price derivatives are inferred from 
the estimation of the budget shares logprice derivatives, which we 
define as: 
h
i
i
h
i c
qd
dw ≡
ln
. 
 
As an example, let us consider the case of the AIDS model: 
( )

++= ∑ QaEqw
h
ij jijii
lnln δγα ,  (17) 
where wi is the individual budget share and ( )Qa  is defined by the 
Translog price index formula: 
( ) ∑∑∑ ++= i j jiiji ii qqqa lnln21lnln 0 γααQ . 
 
In this case it is simple to show that: ( )
i
ii
h
i qd
adc
ln
ln Qδγ −=    (18) 
 
More in general, it can be easily shown that the own-price elasticity 
in these models is equal to: 
11
,
−= hih
i
qx cwihi
η .   (19) 
 
From the previous formula, depending from cih being smaller 
(larger) than 0, the demand for good i will be “elastic” (“rigid”). 
However, it must be remarked that, being cih variable across the 
individuals, some intervals of the estimated parameters 
theoretically allow for the demand of a good to be elastic for some 
individuals and inelastic for others. 
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Actually, the elasticities’ formula can tell us more. In particular, we 
can also recover the size of the individual demand derivatives. In 
fact, rearranging, we can write: ( )
i
h
i qx
h
i
h
i wc ,1 η+= , 
from which, after a some algebra, 
( ) 2
i
h
h
i
h
i
i
h
i
q
Ewc
dq
dx −= , 
that is: 
i
h
i
i
h
h
i
i
h
i
q
x
q
Ec
dq
dx −= 2 .9   (20) 
 
By itself, previous formula cannot help us so much given that an 
econometric estimation of hic  is required for its implementation. 
However, it is interesting to see which are its implications when 
setting e=1 for the second order approximated welfare measures 
when combined with the Engel curve functional form assumptions 
which lead to equation (20).  
 
As it was seen in the previous section, in this case the social 
weights can be set equal to hh E1=β . Let us first note that the 
covariance term b~  in equation (15a) can be rewritten as: 
                                                 
9 When cih <0, for all h, i.e. the demand is elastic for each individual, both terms 
on the right hand side of this equation are negative. This implies (provided that i 
is not an inferior good), that the individual demand responses become higher in 
absolute terms as the individual expenditure increases. As a consequence, the 
distribution of these price demand responses is negatively correlated to the 
distribution of the social weights (which are a negative function of Eh). Hence, 
for the linear- and quadratic-in-logs family of Engel curves, the term b in the 
equation (15) is negative (positive) if the demand for the good to which the 
price reform is referred is elastic (inelastic). Even without knowing the size of b, 
we can therefore conclude that equation (16) represents an upper (lower) bound 
of a second order welfare approximation if the individual demand of the good 
under scrutiny are elastic (inelastic). 
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1
1
−∂
∂
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


∂
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=
−
H
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h
i
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i
q
x
q
x
H
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β . 
The application of the relationships between the parameters 
defined by equation (20) yields: 
( ) 111~
1
2
1
−−



∂
∂= ∑
=
−
H
h
h
hh
i
h
i
ii
h
i Ewc
qq
x
H
b β
β . 
 
Without lack of generality we can set 1=β .10 By substituting the 
hh E1=β  into the previous equation we therefore get,  
( ) 11~ 12 −−



∂
∂=
−
ii
i
h
i
i
wc
q
x
q
b .   (20a) 
We leave to the appendix to show that previous formula simplifies 
to: 
1~~ −= idb .    (21) 
 
Hence, it immediately follows that equations (15) and (15a) reduce 
to: 


 ∆+−=∆
∆
ii qX
i
i
ii
i q
qXd
q
W
,2
1~ η ,   (22) 
that is to an expression which is a function of the DC and 
aggregate demand price elasticity. 
 
Overall, general expressions such as (13) or more specific ones 
based on functional assumption such as (20) show us that the 
value of a second order approximation is always smaller than a 
first order one. In fact, second order approximations depict some 
efficiency effects by means of the aggregated elasticity parameter, 
which usually is negative. As it was remarked above, the proximity 
                                                 
10 In this case we also have ii dd
~=  
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to the first order approximation is partially restored when the 
demand for the good is elastic (being the covariance b negative). 
 
To summarise, in this section we showed how and under what 
conditions the estimation of the effects on consumers’ welfare of 
the price changes referable to the privatisation of some previously 
publicly provided goods can be based on aggregated data. In the 
next section, we briefly report on the British privatisation policies 
which welfare effects we would like to estimate.  
3. Price trends in the British privatised industries 
The privatised industries which we examine in this paper are the 
following ones: Telecommunications, Railways, Bus services, 
Electricity, Gas, Water and Coal. All of them were privatised by 
the British Conservative Governments in a period ranging from 
the early Eighties to mid Nineties (the reference years for each 
privatisation are reported on the top of table 1).  
 
This large spread among the changes of ownership dates has of 
course entailed a certain degree of heterogeneity in the forms of 
public divestitures which were chosen and in the following 
regulatory initiatives adopted. However, on the whole the common 
feeling has been that of a unique policy (“privatisation”) carried 
out in successive steps. We are also taking this perspective as well, 
but the limits of this assumption should be borne in mind. 
 
A case which is particularly affected by this lack of synchrony is 
represented by the analysis of the price trends in the various 
industries after privatisation. In fact, while for some sectors such 
as telecommunications and gas industry we dispose of about 15 
yearly observations since their privatisations, for the rail and coal 
industries the “after privatisation” period reduces to 4 years only.11 
As a consequence, while for some cases a clear-cut judgement 
could be reliably expressed (e.g., “telephony prices have 
                                                 
11 Being 1999 the last year for which adequate information has been made 
available. 
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decreased”, or “water is more expensive than it was before 
privatisation”), for some other sectors a definite trend has not 
emerged yet. 
 
While referring the reader to Florio (2002, ch. 7) for a more 
detailed description of the evolution of the prices and of the 
institutional aspects, such us the price cap systems adopted by the 
sectors’ regulators, here we briefly focus on a point particularly 
important when analysing privatisation policies as “price reforms”, 
i.e. the fact that trends in nominal prices “before” and “after” 
privatisations in the UK does not show a clear structural break, at 
least until the end of the “Conservative era”. 
 
More in detail, in the case of electricity -- which privatisation 
started in 1990,12 -- prices had been falling for over a decade under 
public ownership and they increased in preparation for 
privatisation and in the years that followed, especially prices for 
the residential users. Subsequently they started falling again in a 
way not too different from the long term trend up to 1995, date 
which seems to mark the starting point of a more clear decreasing 
trend (of course still in its infancy). 
 
In the case of gas there was a net drop in prices after privatisation 
in 1986, but prices had been falling with respect to the Retail Price 
Index also in the Seventies when British Gas was a nationalized 
industry. Conversely, a relative increase was again registered by 
considering the 5 years preceding the privatisation of British Gas. 
As in the case of electricity, an apparent stronger decreasing trend 
has started since the mid Nineties. 
 
The privatisation of British Telecom dates back to 1984. Although 
the construction of a price index for this industry represents a very 
difficult task (due to the variety of contracts, the changes in the 
pricing methods and the difficulty in obtaining disaggregated data 
for each category of user), the existing aggregate estimates suggest 
                                                 
12 In that year the twelve Regional Electricity Companies in England and Wales 
were privatised, followed by the two Scottish companies in 1991. 
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that after privatisation there has been a reduction in the unit cost 
for business users and, for a number of years, an increase in the 
unit cost for domestic and public phone users. More recently (and 
a couple of years before the aforementioned cases), a generalised 
reduction in tariffs has been taking place, following a change in the 
regulatory constraint and increased competition.13 
 
No clear trend emerges also for those services which have 
registered relative price increases since privatisation. In the case of 
water, the tariffs rose considerably after privatisation, but the lack 
of adequate previous information does not allow us to control for 
the behaviour of the prices under the public ownership. Also in 
the case of buses and rail the price of the service increased after 
privatisation, but the same had happened before. 
4. Empirical analysis. 
In this section we present a some preliminary estimates of the 
effects of the British privatisation policy on consumers’ welfare. 
These estimates were carried out by applying a number of the 
measures introduced in section 2. As a matter of fact, although the 
analyst’s preference should be given to the second order welfare 
change approximations, at least in the presence of adequate 
information, those measures mainly suited to marginal changes still 
remain useful for comparison purposes and evaluating the likely 
magnitude of the errors associated to first order approximations. 
 
The first data from which to start is the direction of the market 
price changes. The time series by ONS (various editions) display a 
dichotomous behaviour, with a relative reduction for telephony, 
electricity and gas and an increase for water and transport. The size 
of these variations and the overall families’ expenditure in the 
related sectors is, however, not homogenous. Our broad 
calculations suggest a diminution of 16% of the prices of the 
privatised sector as compared to the path of the Retail Price Index 
                                                 
13 For more details see Florio (2001). 
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(RPI) since 1987 to 1999.14 To set 1987 as the starting year for 
evaluating the price effects of the British privatisation policy as a 
whole is, of course, an ad hoc hypothesis.  
 
The same applies for those assumptions which define the share of 
the price variation actually attributable to the change of ownership. 
The determination of this percentage always is a difficult task 
(which should be handled by drawing a counterfactual scenario) 
and becomes particularly critical when looking to privatisation as a 
price reform. As a starting point, one could argue that a 
benchmark hypothesis about privatisation effects on price changes 
lies between either assuming that privatisations were responsible 
for all price changes or that continuation of public ownership 
would have generated exactly the same price changes as those 
observed. 
 
In the estimates we are presenting in the next subsection, we 
substantially escape this problem by considering the most 
favourable scenario about privatisation effects, that is by 
attributing to the change of ownership regime the whole deviation 
of the prices of the privatised industries with respect to the RPI. In 
this sense, the following results constitute an upper bound to any 
positive or negative welfare effects. 
 
The results of the analysis carried out at the individual industry 
level are presented in tables 1 and 2. The first part of these tables 
contains the information used for the implementation of the 
various measures reported therein. In particular, the privatisation 
year15 has been used for determining the “price reform” interval. 
Having taken into consideration 1999 as the final year of our 
analysis, for each commodity the welfare variations have been 
calculated in one case (table 1) as the effects of a unique price 
                                                 
14 We obtained this value by building an aggregate Laspeyres index of the privatised 
sector centered on 1987 by using the industry-level ONS time series. 
 
15 For those cases in which the privatisation has been carried out in subsequent 
steps, a median year has been considered. 
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reform which size is given by the difference between the 
percentage variation of the related prices index and the overall RPI 
in the interval “privatisation year—1999”, and as the sum of yearly 
price reforms in the other case (table 2). 
 
The second order measures need to compute the aggregate 
demand price elasticities. For the aims of this paper, we have 
limited our choice to the values reported in Florio (2002).16 
 
As for the distributional characteristics reported on the top of the 
tables which were used in the implementation of the various 
formulae, we calculated them by using the 1994 edition of the 
Family Expenditure Survey.17 Following the more standard 
approach, the social weights have been derived by using an 
Atkinson’s Social Welfare Function like that in (8) and scaled so 
that to set their mean β  equal to 1, which makes the 
implementation of formulae (15) easier. The total household 
expenditure data which is needed for the computation of the DC 
has been expressed in terms of equivalent adult. The OECD 
equivalence scales were used for this purpose.18 The DC used in 
                                                 
16 In general, the specialised economic literature offers several studies on 
aggregate demand to which the analyst can refer without undertaking new 
specific estimations. We plan to refer to this literature in future research. 
 
17 As we said in the introduction, this paper aims to promote the adoption of 
“easier” approaches in applied welfare analyses in which, in principle, only the 
use of aggregated data should be required. Under this perspective, also well-
defined distributional value judgements (such as DC) on the consumption of 
single commodities could be considered as an aggregate information. By making 
direct use of a micro-level dataset we are someway weakening the consistency of 
our approach, but the supply of tabulated DC (which would not constitute a 
difficult task!) is not at present foreseen in the national household expenditures 
reports. 
 
18 According to these scales, the first adult counts as 1, additional adults as 0.7 
and children as 0.5. 
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the tables are only those corresponding to a “coefficient of 
inequality aversion” equal to one. 
 
As said when we derived equation (15-15a), the only very micro 
level data which we would need when implementing a second 
order welfare approximation are the covariance “b” and “ b~ ”. In 
order to overcome this problem, a Working-Leser (or its quadratic 
extension) functional form assumption has been done with respect 
to the latent Engel curves of the observed demands so that, having 
set to 1 the coefficient of inequality aversion, equation (22) could 
be used when computing the second order welfare approximation. 
 
As for the sector expenditures, we have used “median year 
expenditures” (between privatisation and 1999) for the calculations 
reported in table 1, when we considered price variations as a “one 
shot” change; and annual expenditures when computing the 
welfare effects as a sum of yearly changes. In order to keep a direct 
“monetary” interpretation of the welfare measures, we have scaled 
price indexes so to set the price of the reference year equal to 1. 
This allows us to consider the recorded expenditures as if they 
were “quantities” and directly apply the approximated measures 
(which are usually based on quantity indexes). All the welfare 
changes are expressed at 1994 prices.19 The values reported in 
these tables are millions of pounds so that, in principle, they could 
allow for an immediate cost-benefit analysis of the other net gains 
or losses by other agents involved in British privatisations. 
 
As reported in the left columns of the tables, we have computed 
both first and second order welfare change approximations, 
whether without or with distributive corrections. The “socially 
unweighted” first order measure is a Laspeyres Index in case of 
table 2 (welfare variations as a sum of yearly changes). In case of 
table 1 (price variations considered as a one shot change) we have 
used a modified version of the Waddams Price-Hancock (1998, 
                                                 
19 Similarly to the computation of DC, we chose 1994 as a reference year given 
that, between the various industries, it represents the “median of the median 
years between the privatisation year and 1999”. 
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appendix B) welfare measure, where expenditures and prices are 
those of  the median year between privatisation and 1999. The 
second order measures do correspond to formulae (16) and (22). 
 
Let us finally turn to the results. Due to the dissimilarity in the 
direction of the price changes, consumers had both losses and 
gains. In both tables, the larger gain is clearly referable to 
telephony, surely determined by the relative importance of this 
service within the privatised basket, the length of the “post 
reform” period (privatisation of BT occurred in 1984), but also by 
the substantial price decrease recorded since its privatisation. The 
second privatised industry which has substantially contributed to 
the increase of consumers’ welfare has been the gas one (which 
privatisation dates 1986). By looking to the yearly welfare 
variations (not reported in this paper) one would observe that the 
importance of the benefits deriving from this sector has been 
decreasing in the recent years, as a result of its reduced weight in 
consumers’ expenditures. This is the opposite of what has 
happened with respect to the water sector, which presently 
represents the larger source of losses for British consumers among 
the privatised utilities. 
 
Besides being an important part of the consumers’ privatised good 
basket, this sector exhibit price variations of more than 30% in 
absolute terms. In these cases it becomes particularly important to 
focus on second order measures, given the high monetary values 
which can be involved, and check for the different implications of 
the procedures which respectively lead to table 1 and table 2 
results. In table 1, the difference between first and second order 
approximations can reach values close to 15% (e.g., see the row 
reporting the “first order error” between the first and second order 
“socially weighted” measures, which indicate underestimates of the 
welfare gains of about 11% for the telephone industry and an 
overestimate of about 14% for the water sector).20 Conversely, in 
                                                 
20 It can be easily seen that this percentage value is nearly independent of the 
size of the price variation. 
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table 2 the first order error is usually less than 3%. If no reliable 
aggregate demand elasticities are available, this clearly advocates 
for a computation of the welfare effects on a yearly price variation 
base, which reduces the overall result to a sum of “small price 
reforms”. 
 
The use of the simpler procedure adopted in the case of table 1 
also has some consequences in the determination of the size of the 
welfare change. When an “older” privatised industry is considered, 
the use of the median year as unique base for the computation 
leads to strong underestimates of the welfare effect (this is the case 
of telephony). On the contrary, we incur in a likely overestimate 
when a large price variation occurs in a small interval (as in the 
water case). 
 
As for the distributional corrections,21 in general their size is 
substantially determined by the value of the DC also in the case of 
the second order approximation.22 Moreover, in the exercise 
reported in these tables even the slight differences existing in the 
general case disappear due to effects of the functional form 
hypothesis (linear or quadratic-in logs “latent” Engel curves of the 
goods under examination) which was used in order to obtain the 
simplified formula (22). 
 
The last column of the tables provides an indicator of the 
aggregate effects on consumer welfare. As for the differences 
between first and second order measures, the aggregation seems to 
exacerbate the first order error in both cases, but the effects are 
particularly severe in the first case (28.7%). When summing over 
yearly variation, the difference is limited to 3.4%.23 Let us finally 
                                                 
21 These corrections do not include the impact of rebalancing of tariffs within 
each industry and by different types of consumers. 
 
22 This is immediate when looking how the DC enters equation (15). For first 
order approximation this relationship is trivial. 
 
23 Remember that, to this difference, one should add the likely difference 
existing between approximated and “exact” measures. In the well-known Banks 
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note that the procedure adopted in table 2 leads to a definitely 
more positive evaluation about the overall gross impact of the 
privatisation policy. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the possibilities of applying a (price) 
reform approach to the analysis of the effects of the British 
privatisation policy on consumers’ welfare. To this aim, a series of 
first order and second order approximated measures has been 
discussed and introduced, fostering the use of distributional 
characteristics as an aggregate indicator of some distributional 
implications of policy reforms. 
 
The implementation of the proposed measures has revealed the 
presence of relevant effects at the single industry level, although 
with a heterogeneous behaviour. At an aggregate level the effects 
partially compensate each other. Considering that we have 
attributed to privatisations the whole price chance, and that a 
much less favourable scenario about privatisation effects on prices 
could have been adopted, particularly under a counterfactual of 
continued nationalised industry, we conclude that the overall 
contribution to British consumers’ welfare of the privatisation 
policy has been rather modest, if compared to the huge monetary 
values involved in the process. The range of gross welfare impacts 
we find is between £ 2.8 billions with socially weighted first order 
approximation for a “median year” change, and £ 5.7 billions for 
unweighted second order approximation as a sum of yearly 
variations. This is equivalent to 50-100 pounds per capita. The net 
impact, we may conjecture, was less than this because it is unlikely 
that the nationalised industry were totally unable to pass to 
consumers exogenous savings in costs (e.g., decreasing cost in 
telecommunications and in fuel prices). 
 
                                                                                                         
et al. (1996) exercise, the difference between second order approximations and 
exact measures (in the form of a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
expenditure function), amounted only to 0.3%. 
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Of course, what is lacking at this stage of our investigation is just 
the construction of a plausible counterfactual scenarios regarding 
price evolution under continued public ownership. Once these 
scenarios are somewhat determined (for example looking at cost 
trends and determinants), the researcher (or the regulator) can 
easily go through welfare computations. For this purpose, a series 
of “ready-to-implement” formulae are available also for large 
“price reforms”, and they do not need the estimation of a micro-
level demand system, once one is ready to give up determining an 
“exact measure” of the welfare change. Besides, at an aggregate 
level, even a first order approximation (which does not take into 
account the curvatures of aggregate demands) seem to provide a 
quite accurate indication of the overall welfare effects if one 
considers the whole “reform” as a sum of small yearly changes.  
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Appendix: 
In this appendix we must show that 
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From equation (19), remember that the following relationship 
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Solving by ( )ii wc −  and substituting into the covariance 
expression we therefore get: 
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from which 
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b , 
which by using the value hh E1=β  deriving from the hypothesis 
e=1 allows us to write: 
11~ −= ∑
h
hh
i
i
x
X
b β ,   (A.3) 
that is, remembering the definition of distributive characteristic, 
1~ −= idb .    (A.4) 
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Table 1: Welfare variations (in millions of pounds) for each privatised industry (computed at “median years” expenditures). 
Privatised utilities
Phone Rail Bus Electricity Gas Water Coal TOTAL
Privatisation year 1984 1995 1989 1990 1986 1990 1995
Median year 1991 1997 1994 1994 1992 1994 1997
E* 6842 3144 2808 8082 5684 4014 499
P* 0.88 1.19 1.14 1.01 0.85 1.52 0.82
P1 0.98 1.18 1.04 0.97 1.02 1.14 0.85
P2 0.6 1.22 1.19 0.8 0.71 1.7 0.8
0.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2
0.875 0.573 0.756 0.893 0.9 0.938 0.992
Welfare measures
First order approximations
"Modified WP-H" : M= E* (p1 – p2)/p* 2779.243 -113.960 -417.030 1360.337 1815.768 -2225.584 22.609 3221.3
"Socially weighted": 2431.837 -65.299 -315.274 1214.781 1634.191 -2087.598 22.428 2835.0
Distributive correction -12.50% -42.70% -24.40% -10.70% -10.00% -6.20% -0.80% -11.9
Second order approximations
"Unweighted" :
3092.939 -112.155 -389.159 1417.579 2010.828 -1917.087 22.721 4125.6
"Socially weighted"  (Linear or quadratic-in-logs Engel curves)
2706.322 -64.265 -294.204 1265.898 1809.745 -1798.228 22.539 3647.8
First order "error" 11.29% -1.58% -6.68% 4.21% 10.74% -13.86% 0.50% 28.6
ii qX ,η
mx i ,
η
id
~
iii dqXddW −≡
iqX
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i qq
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Note: The symbol * refers to median year values. 
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Table 2: Welfare variations (in millions of pounds) for each privatised industry (computed as a sum of yearly variations). 
Privatised utilities
Phone Rail Bus Electricity Gas Water Coal TOTAL
Privatisation year 1984 1995 1989 1990 1986 1990 1995
Median year 1991 1997 1994 1994 1992 1994 1997
0.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2
0.875 0.573 0.756 0.893 0.9 0.938 0.992
Welfare measures
First order approximations
"Laspeyres index" : M= X1(p1 – p2) 4211.055 -132.640 -411.214 1438.416 2072.856 -1701.746 33.601 5510.329
"Socially weighted": 3684.673 -76.003 -310.878 1284.506 1865.570 -1596.238 33.332 4884.963
Distributive correction -12.50% -42.70% -24.40% -10.70% -10.00% -6.20% -0.80% -11.35%
Second order approximations
"Unweighted" 
4290.320 -133.820 -397.713 1469.587 2111.365 -1675.905 33.674 5697.508
"Socially weighted"  (Linear or quadratic-in-logs Engel curves)
3754.030 -76.679 -300.671 1312.341 1900.229 -1571.999 33.405 5050.655
First order "error" 1.88% 0.89% -3.28% 2.17% 1.86% -1.52% 0.22% 3.39%
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